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ABSTRACT: Ukrainian lands in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have 
been in proximity of great geopolitical changes several times. During that time the 
Ukrainian nation – due to various factors – encountered a number of “windows 
of opportunity” for achieving the realization of dreams about independence and 
national sovereignty. The author identified in the period considered four “general 
moments,” of which two have been completed successfully. The first of these oc-
curred in 1990–1991, when for the first time in modern history, Ukrainians man-
aged to achieve a lasting and relatively stable independence. The second of the 
“moments” – still unresolved – are events that began in the late autumn of 2013. 
The process, called “Revolution of Dignity”, represents a new quality in the history 
of the Ukrainian nation, therefore, that the Ukrainians have to defend the status 
quo (independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, etc.) but not to seek to achieve 
an independent being. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the ability of 
Ukrainians to achieve and maintain independence is largely a function of the rela-
tive power of the Russian state as measured with respect to the shape and quality 
of international relations.
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Ukraine’s geopolitical importance in the modern scientific re-
flection and views, which can be described as “colloquial,” seems 
to be pretty obvious (Moczulski, 2010: 312). The country, located 
in the basin of the Dnieper River, with wide access to the Black 
Sea, an important human and economic potential, and above all, 
being a special keystone between “East” and “West,” has been pre-
destined to play an important geopolitical role (Al-Rodhan, 2009: 
18–19). Perhaps these factors decided about quite evident in the 
past century phenomenon, the essence of which may be the formu-
lated as the assertion that Ukrainian lands and affairs were gener-
Jacek Reginia-Zacharski6
ally regarded as the object of the game between the global powers 
(Moczulski 1999: 707–708). Ukrainian efforts to conclude aspira-
tions for subjectivity were relatively rare and only rather briefly had 
a chance of appearing in world politics. These unique situations 
were associated with deep turbulence in the international configu-
ration/model of the distribution of power, which could occur as 
a result of the struggle/war on an enormous scale. In the twenti-
eth century this “window of opportunity” appeared mainly during 
and after the First World War. During another collective conflict 
– the Second World War, the Ukrainian lands in effect only slightly 
marked the occurrence of opportunities for their own independent 
existence. It was primarily due to the fact that the Soviet Union 
achieved the status of a superpower. This justifies a conclusion that 
the great military conflicts created a chance for Ukraine only when 
they led to a significant weakening (or temporarily collapse) the pos-
sibility of Russia’s geopolitical influence. The turn of the 80’s and 
90’s of the twentieth century is an emphatic confirmation of this 
observation. The disintegration of the Soviet (Russian) empire and 
related geopolitical impotence was not the result of an open armed 
struggle, however, it led to the effective use of the arising opportuni-
ties for the implementation of political, national and state identity 
Ukraine (D. Arel, B. A. Ruble, 2006: 227–229). It is worth highlight-
ing that all three cited attempts (after all, even during the Second 
World War Ukrainian nationalist elites made some effort to achieve 
a state or quasi-state identity) were calculated to achieve the effect 
of the entrance to the geopolitical game on the principles of being 
an independent and sovereign player.
The nature of the events which took place in Ukraine in the 
2013 and 2014 was definitely different. First of all, the Ukraini-
an state was sovereign, so in terms of international law and or-
der one cannot talk about “the struggle for independence,” but 
rather about its defense. In addition, it should it should be noted 
that the geopolitical processes, particularly related to the flows of 
power in the world, the quality of particular centers and the di-
rections of the change were very dynamic and turbulent in that 
time (Al-Rodhan, 2009: 93–94). It would be a truism to say that 
the world at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first 
century is far different from the world at the end of the previous 
century (Brzeziński, 2007: kindle edition), however, it is necessary 
to capture these differences, particularly in the context of Ukrai-
nian lands. The main factor influencing was the realization of the 
postulate of subjectivity of Ukraine (perhaps the first time from the 
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settlement of Pereyaslav). It is reasonable, therefore, to emphasize 
that the turn of the century was marked by a more effective coming 
out of the Russian State from a period of time referred to as “the 
Troubles” (Smuta), which was characterized, on the one hand, by 
internal weakness, but mainly in the field of deep impotence of the 
international game. “Putin’s” Russia is a country that dynamically 
and successfully has returned to the group of major players in the 
world, both in the individual as well as collective formulas (even 
in a heavily promoted, but still a bit “spectral” concept of BRIC or 
BRICS). It can be assumed that the process of coming out from 
the geopolitical collapse of the Russian Federation has intensified 
in response to the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union 
– “Rose” in Georgia (2003), “Orange” in Ukraine (2004–2005), and 
“Tulip” in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The first two especially proved to be 
dangerous from the perspective of the Kremlin, as they led to a pro-
found geopolitical reorientation of foreign policy regarding Georgia 
and Ukraine (Olchawa, 2009: 117). The Russian Federation took 
a strongly negative position against these changes. Of course one 
cannot recognize that, until 2003, the Russian Federation favorably 
looked at emancipation trends in the area of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). The lack of decisive action and rather 
modest tools held by the Kremlin were results of self-conscious 
of relatively weakness rather. On the other hand, Georgian and 
Ukrainian aspirations were considered in Russia as formulated 
within acceptable limits. The situation was changed in 1999–2004 
due to the admission countries from Central Europe to NATO and 
the European Union (Wilson, 2005: 21). As a result, the “strategic 
culture” of the West came into direct contact with the boundar-
ies of the area defined by the Russian Federation in the mid-90s 
of the twentieth century as strategically important “near abroad” 
(Cordesman, Al-Rodhan, 2006: 112) (Shoemaker, 2014: 90). It was 
a significant fact that since 2001 the United States – properly seen 
as the main actor in organizing the security architecture of the 
transatlantic space – were involved initially in wars in Afghanistan 
(since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003). Since 2009, the foreign policy of 
the United States, through the announcement of the “reset” in rela-
tions with the Russian Federation and “Asiatic Pivot,” transferred 
the center of gravity from European theater to Asian issues. It has 
opened a lot of space for the activity of Russian politics. In fact, this 
period can be moved to the mid-2008, when the US Congress was 
dominated since 2007 by Democrats (110 seats), and was strongly 
supported by the growing chances of Barack Obama to became the 
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next President of the United States. Those factors allowed Russian 
strategists to assume a possibility of deep revalue in the foreign 
policy of the United States in the close future (Olchawa, 2009: 183). 
Necessary tools for the new and active policy of the Russian Fed-
eration were secured due to the high prices of energy and lucrative 
arms contracts. It is also worth noting that in the first case, Russia 
led a fairly open policy calculated to monopolize certain markets, or 
at least their domination. It was possible according to an aggressive 
policy in the energetic markets, as well as events in the world (the 
“Arab spring,” the war in Syria, and so on.) That situation is still 
maintained, ensuring the Federation has effective tools for activities 
designed to rebuild their geopolitical zone of influence. It seems that 
the process was started about 1999 (although, as mentioned, some 
attempts were made earlier – but were not successfully completed 
due to the relative weakness). Since 2008, the “gathering of the 
Russian lands” entered into a much more intensive phase (Al-Rod-
han, 2009: 111). The Caucasian war of the 2008, however, made it 
clear that the use of armed force for the realization of geopolitical 
objectives in specific regions does not entail unacceptable political 
costs. Far more – the full geopolitical success was reached by Mos-
cow politicians only after some time. Replacing the cadres of Geor-
gia led the state – as it seems – to resignation from pro-Western 
course. The ongoing game in 2013–2014 towards the geopolitical 
future of Ukraine is another piece of Russian actions that result is 
to be the redefinition of geopolitical space in the Eurasian region.
The uniqueness of the recent situation in Ukraine in compari-
son with previous (twentieth-century) openings of “windows of op-
portunity” should not obscure the existence of a certain continu-
ity in geopolitical trends. Even more, the current situation should 
be seen as firmly rooted in the contexts of the past and referring 
to them (Burdzy, 1995: 39).
Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts in the Years 1917–1945
For a long period modern geopolitics – from the appearance of 
such reflection in contemporary political thought – was dominated 
by Europeans and European issues (Moczulski, 2010: 72). This re-
sulted directly from the situation of the architecture of international 
relations and the world’s politics on a macro scale in the late nine-
teenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The United States 
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based on its own (incidentally, geopolitical) doctrine, persisted in 
durable splendid isolation, as Asian countries were the subject of 
the political game, or just woke up to the power. Europe, there-
fore, remained the only active center for the formulation of political 
thought with global aspirations, or those of supra-regional dimen-
sion. This phenomenon should also be associated with the fact, 
being acknowledged by many researchers, of the menial and ancil-
lary role of geopolitics as a tool for the description and projection of 
the political situation at the level of decision-making. The ancillary 
can also be seen in the sphere of motivation (and hence ideology) 
of the major world powers (Moczulski, 2010: 393). At the turn of 
the century, Europe seemed to be, and actually was, the center of 
creation and the point of the reference of the main mega-trends in 
world politics. The scope of relations between the European powers 
determined the overall state of tension in international relations 
(Moczulski, 2010: 253–254).
The Russo-Japanese War was an exception, but even then, this 
competition was perceived as an element representing the position 
of the Russian Empire in a European game. It can also be said that 
the defeat in the war restored full Russia’s interest in European 
issues. These few remarks, though do not exhaust the problem, 
unless they sufficiently explain the phenomenon of the Europe-
centric nature of geopolitics – at least until the end of the 1930’s 
(Jean, 2004: 47).
Another, no less important consideration ought to be made, 
which is that, although the region of the Central and Eastern Eu-
rope was not the theater of immediate struggle, it was a keystone 
of geopolitical thinking in this period (Moczulski, 2010: 83). Crises 
and conflicts that took place before 1914 should be seen as pe-
ripheral clash or actions undertaken for the purpose of increasing 
the potential in the face of the expected confrontation in the main 
theater – Central and Eastern Europe. It will not be an exaggeration 
to say that modern European politics (and thus the world) began 
after 1871. After that moment, European centers of power were 
finally created and began to struggle for power in a certain political 
dimension. Since this time goes back to deep German-French an-
tagonism, which dominated European politics for several decades. 
While the conflict between the Republic of France and the Ger-
man Empire had a dominant meaning, whereas strategic decisions 
in the European melting pot were conditioned by the quality of 
the relationship on the axis between Berlin & St. Petersburg (Mo- 
czulski, 2010: 502–505). Close cooperation or alliance between the 
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empires, would generate the political quality, which would not com-
pete any other European power. In turn, a sharp conflict – at least 
at first glance – would block potential German aggression to the 
West. Such a chain of relationships dominated European geopoliti-
cal thinking for more than a half century. It also clearly exhibited 
the importance of the Central European region, as the area of  the 
clash of interests or area of possible cooperation. Quite soon one 
more element came to the calculation: in the case of open German-
Russian conflict, the area of Central and Eastern Europe would be 
the scene of warfare, waged by the two giants (Moczulski, 2010: 
519). Thus, the research on the nature of geographical conditions 
as well as the study of a complex mosaic of ethno-cultural and po-
litical took on a special significance (Dima, 2010: 8–9).
One of the first coherent and comprehensive geopolitical con-
cepts was formulated at the threshold of the twentieth century by 
Swedish geographer and Germanophile, Rudolf Kjellén. Although 
the Professor of Gothenburg and Uppsala, first was dealing with 
cases of the political and cultural condition of a state (Moczulski, 
2010: 7–9), he later focused on the conditions of the Western Eu-
ropean chain of dependencies (Kjellén, 1915). After all, the ongoing 
events of the Great War the East Europe region caught his atten-
tion. Kjellén claimed that the German-Russian borderland (whether 
it is better to speak about Slavo-Germanic limes) was a natural 
theater of clashes (Moczulski, 2010: 508–509). It was a significant 
factor determining the nature of both areas – on the one hand, the 
industrial center with limited raw materials and permanent import 
demand, from the other: lands rich in raw materials – primarily 
food (Ukraine) and the infrastructure unable to process and con-
sume them. Kjellén’s assumption that the “border” conflict between 
Russia and Germany had a much broader context – it had vested 
interests across the globe, was also important. In the general scope 
of his geopolitical reflection, the geographer recognized the natural-
ness of the existence of three ‘pan-regions’: American, German, and 
Japanese (Moczulski, 2010: 591–520). The sine qua non condition 
for the realization of this model in his opinion (regard to contem-
porary reality it is difficult to disagree with this view) was victori-
ous war against Russia, which he saw as a part of a global war. In 
such conditions, the CEE region would be, on the one hand, “the 
prize,” and on the other hand, the main theater of war. Reflec-
tion related to the Kjellén’s concept, but also present in almost the 
entire reflection on contemporary politics should be raised here: 
international relations often have been seen at the level of “great 
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space” (Powers), and their shape as the result of the game between 
them. It has naturally led to reductionist assumptions in terms of 
the number of subjects in the ongoing political game (Jean, 2004: 
97–101). The “strongest organisms” were surviving at the expense 
of smaller and weaker ones. In such an intellectual atmosphere the 
position of the regions had to be brought at most to play the role 
of the object or area of  clashes. This fascination of Darwinism was 
also evident in the views of the other “geopolitician” of the turn of 
the century, Friedrich Ratzel. The ground for his deliberations was 
the thesis of the naturalness of conflicts and clashes between politi-
cal territorial organisms (states). Ratzel acknowledged a tendency 
to expand their areas of ownership and influence in the spatial 
dimension (Raumsinn) as an inherent feature of international poli-
tics. The international environment of the game was considered as 
a “zero-sum,” where profits naturally determined the size of losses 
of the opponent (Moczulski, 2010: 8). In Ratzel’s concept, Central 
Europe and its structure became both the center and the reason 
for expansion. Ratzel pointed out that the fact of the overpopulation 
of Germany, unprecedented anywhere else in the region, naturally 
tended to expand and extend the living space. Commenting the 
significance of the geographical factor for the behavior of nations, 
he remarked that “in Africa, Germans and French are not as hostile 
to each other as in Europe.” Another reflection – basic for Europe 
– was the naturalness of the phenomenon of variation of political 
borders, which in his opinion were marked by the stigma of arti-
ficiality. Axes of communication and boundaries generated in this 
way played much greater role in the relations between states. The 
boundaries, therefore, for Ratzel were a function (or effect) of the 
movement in international relations. Taking for consideration a dy-
namic of the borders the feature of territoriality of participants in 
the international game should be considered as naturally variable. 
On the other hand, the German thinker perceived attachment of 
states to their ownership, what made the conflicts between nation-
states a regular part of the world order.
A novelty in comparison to other concepts relating to interna-
tional issues, posting Germany in the limelight, was a postulate 
of direct expansion due the vector along the south direction – and 
therefore, to the Balkans and Turkey. The Central European region 
took on a new dimension, yielding to the extension of the South-
ern dimension. It is tempting to reflect that, for Ratzel, the south-
ern parts of Europe constituted a sort of “geopolitical vacuum” 
marked by a clash of different influences, but which was not finally 
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“developed.” The traditional direction of German expansion – East 
– also was present in the concepts of the German geographer. He 
recognized, however, as a better tool for realization of geopolitical 
objectives on this direction a wide spectrum of economic measures 
(soft economic expansion). For the first time in modern geopolitics, 
the political thought of Friedrich Ratzel so clearly outlined the rela-
tionship between the objective and the costs of implementation of 
the goals. Ratzel had not renounced the concept of conquering the 
East – but he considered an account of profits or losses (Moczul-
ski, 2010: 498–499). These estimates led him to believe the stra-
tegic direction of the Balkans would be less expensive and – in the 
long term – more promising. One can risk saying that Ratzel only 
creatively developed the structure proposed by Kjellen – through 
expansion into the Balkans and Turkey to achieve control over the 
Black Sea straits and thus economically subjugate Russia. He re-
turned to the thinking about Central and Eastern Europe in terms 
of the subject of international games between the superpowers. 
The works by Kjellen and Ratzel reflected the international ten-
sion, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the Great War. In the 
discourses from the period the need to focus on the problems of 
Central Europe was evident. Expression of two researchers cited 
above, as well as many others pointed to the fact that this region 
was in the focus of international relations theorists (Moczulski, 
2010: 502). It resulted in the development of the concept of Mittel-
europa, which – although originally German – dominated the think-
ing of the fate of continental Europe in the conceptions developed in 
other countries. It will be natural to draw attention to special inter-
est, which those questions raised in the UK. The idea of Mitteleu-
ropa was inextricably linked with the figures of Friedrich Neumann 
and Ernst Jäckh (Wolff-Powęska, 2000: 217–220). Of course, their 
ideas were heavily contaminated with the rhetoric of war, however, 
the image that emerged from them was characterized by a coher-
ent geopolitical vision. The starting point was the observation of 
conflict in continental Europe, or more precisely in its central part, 
between three major political programs: English, Russian and Ger-
man. Vector, which was the resultant of these three forces directed 
towards the south (the Balkans and the Black Sea straits), but still 
remained connected with the initial field of clash – the areas of 
south of the Baltic Sea. The proposal, which pulled out of the above 
assumptions contained the call for efforts to build a “great space” 
(strongly argued by Ratzel). Europe remained impaired because of 
the competition between natural centers of power, such as Russia, 
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the British Empire and the United States. Perceptions of Central 
Europe in the terms of “territorial poverty” and exposition of the 
huge population density gave complementary arguments in favor 
of expansion and construction of a new geopolitical quality un-
der German hegemony, which should be called a “European great 
space” with a power center located in Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and today’s Central and Eastern Europe. It is worth emphasizing, 
that concepts of Mitteleuropa were not based on assumptions of 
direct conquest. These solutions were impractical due to the homo-
geneous national character of the German state, whether in relation 
to the Habsburg Empire to the inability of increasing the number 
of full-fledged entities in dualistic monarchy. The solution – espe-
cially expressed by Neumann in the pages of “Mitteleuropa” (Wolff-
Powęska, 2000: 216), was to create a network of quasi-independent 
states, entirely dependent on the center of power in Berlin (Reginia-
Zacharski, 2004: 98–101). Finally, the goal to be achieved on the 
basis of “gravitation” was actually addiction the whole of Central 
Europe – mainly in the southern dimension. German successes 
such as the seizure of the Polish Kingdom (and the Act of November 
5, 1916.), two peace treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 (with 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic and a month later with Bolshe-
vik Russia), and at the end with Romania (May of 1918) seemed 
to create the possibility of the realization of these intentions. The 
first peace of Brest seemed to be the moment when the Ukrainian 
question for the first time appeared as a geopolitical phenomenon 
(Wheeler-Bennet, 1968: passim).
The breakdown of the Great Powers of continental Europe made 
the concepts gained in importance recognizing the important role 
the so called “Members of the sea world” – the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In particular, the first state has become the land 
on which they grew a concept, which dominated during the interwar 
geopolitical structures (actually it is present geopolitical discourse 
today). This state of affairs was relatively easy to explain. Coun-
tries of the former “central block” had not even started to lick their 
wounds after defeat in a global conflict. France, at best, opted for 
maintaining the great anti-German coalition – often “geopolitical” 
reflection generated at the ground boiled down to use phrase: Boche 
salaire (Reginia-Zacharski, 2004: 209). With respect to the Unit-
ed States, the situation was slightly more complex. The two major 
trends clashed on American soil. On the one hand, the Democrats 
and US President Woodrow Wilson spearheaded global thinking 
rooted in the paradigm of political idealism, whose “embodiment” 
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was to be the League of Nations (Sierpowski, 2000: 98). At the other 
end, Republicans were declaring the need to return to isolationism 
under the conditions of the Monroe Doctrine, in the current time 
based on the military and strategic considerations – mainly, Admi-
ral Mahan.
The British found themselves in a defensive position. Back 
in January 1919, the situation has forced diplomacy of the His 
Majesty’s Government to come up with a common front with the 
United States to the idea of the League of Nations. Immediately 
after completion of the Paris Peace Conference the British, prob-
ably, to their surprise, found themselves in the position of the main 
defenders of the league system. Thus, the British acted in a role 
much less comfortable for them, due to the fact that in 1920 the 
US Congress rejected the ratification of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, which thus meant a deprivation of one of the five main 
pillars. It could therefore been not surprising that recurrent politi-
cal views, referring to realistic paradigms, received a large dose of 
sympathy among British policy makers. One of the major geopo-
litical schools, also influential in the contemporary world, emerged 
from the concept of John Halford Mackinder. Geopolitical founda-
tions of the model were outlined before the outbreak of the Great 
War in the speech and article from 1904 titled “The Geographical 
Pivot of History” (Mackinder, 1942: passim). The core of belief of 
the British geographer was made in the convincement of existing 
of the objective center of political power, which he initially called 
a “pivot area.” These areas were to be laid in the depths of the Eur-
asian continental mass, coinciding roughly with the sovereignty of 
the Romanov Empire. The axis of the Mackinder’s concept became 
a theorem about the existence of a conflict between civilizations of 
Land and Sea (Mackinder, 1942: ). The world for the most of the 
time was determined by the continental center of power, however, 
technological development has caused (or rather allowed) the cre-
ation of a new center of power, which should be called transoceanic. 
Mackinder localized this new quality in the “outer crescent” – an arc 
extending along the left edge of the Atlantic, the northern areas of 
South America, southern Africa, Australia and the Pacific. Accord-
ing to Mackinder, there was the tension resulting from the clash 
of global influences between the centers of power and that defined 
the dynamics of global change. It is worth of noting that, sketched 
structures occupied a prominent place another element – the “in-
ner crescent,” comprising Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle 
East, and South East Asia (Mackinder, 1942: 24). This area was 
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to be by Mackinder both the stake, as well as the area where the 
fight was conducted. Importantly, Ukraine was placed by the Brit-
ish in geocultural Europe and in parts of demonstrating the ability 
of state-building (Mackinder, 1981: 118). It is worth noting that the 
main determinant in this case remained physical geography – espe-
cially the great rivers. The eastern “border” of Europe was marked 
by the basin of the Volga and the Don.
Characteristically, the region of Central and Eastern Europe 
was unlisted by Mackinder as a political factor, took up to the fact 
that the area has not acted as an entity (even as an object) interna-
tional games. The British Empire among its principles at this time 
had placed Europe on one of the last positions. The abovemen-
tioned part of the continent was not really present in the English 
political thought. But the time had come.
The important factor in the initial Mackinder’s concept was 
drawing attention to Europe as an entity of the global game. The 
global approach opened a new discourse in geopolitics. Another 
novelty was an indication of the complementarity of the “pan-re-
gions” in the world (Mackinder, 1942: 98). Relations between them 
were first shown by the British geographer, as a dynamic environ-
ment with the potential of constant change. One can venture the 
thesis that in Mackinder’s concept for the first a tendency to mani-
fest “history” in terms of intercontinental play games based on the 
principles of interdependence appeared, which today would be de-
fined as a model of the interaction network.
The end of the Great War and the need to build a new world 
was not without influence on the design concept of Mackinder. One 
can probably even say that the conditions that followed 1918 were, 
on the one hand, the challenge, and on the other hand, created a 
“training ground” for the possibility to put into practice the politi-
cal reasons stemming from geopolitical objectives. In these inter-
esting times Mackinder undertook to modify his earlier views. The 
result was announced in 1919, in “Democratic Ideals and Reality” 
(Mackinder, 1942: passim). The starting point was the inclusion 
of appearance in the geopolitics of a new quality – the new states 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The core concept of the conviction 
has been done, which still sounds like a canon in geopolitics: “Who 
rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland 
commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the 
world” (Mackinder, 1942: 194). While the location of the center of 
the potency of global power did not change significantly compared 
to earlier views of Mackinder, is actually the Central Europe had 
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become a “tip of the balance” in the concept from 1919 (Peters-
en, 2011: 17). The region was a natural link between the potential 
and the technological possibilities of its use – between Russia and 
Germany. Such thinking in a political reflection of the British was 
not a specific novelty. Even during the Great War in the Politi-
cal Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office emphasized the 
threat to the balance of world power, which may had resulted from 
a possible merger of the two geopolitical regions and their poten-
tials (Reginia-Zacharski, 2004: 300). Both the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the result of the Great War slid a threat. Some events such as 
the signing the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) argued the validity of such 
concerns.
Mackinder’s concept took on a new dimension, and the opin-
ion of particular importance the Central European region received 
the new justification (Moczulski, 2010: 499). The tenure conflict 
between “civilizations of the sea” and “peoples of the land” seemed 
to be permanently present in the concepts of the British geogra-
pher. However, it has to be accepted that, in contrast to the mod-
ern Russian supporters of the idea of  Eurasia (Petersen, 2011: 97), 
Mackinder did not mark any firm boundaries East and West. Ac-
cording to him, lines that ran between Western and Eastern Eu-
rope due to the dynamic structure of international relations, had 
a naturally variable character. It seems reasonable to notice that, 
in 1919, Mackinder was in Central and Eastern Europe and ob-
served the area which he saw as a line of the distinction (Mack-
inder, 1942: 188). Hence, he repeatedly expressed an opinion of 
importance of the region. The result of competition for this part of 
the world had decisive meaning for the position of Europe in the 
whole global structure. In short, the fate of Central and Eastern 
Europe was going to decide the character – “land” or “sea,” for the 
entire continent.
While in the conceptual phase of “building of the New Europe” 
might seem to be based on the concepts of John H. Mackinder, the 
realities of international policy and issues of “balance of power” 
became the keys to the new world and European order designed 
in Paris in 1919 (Rommer, 1988: passim). In practice, Central and 
Eastern Europe were not ruled by anyone. Located between Russia/
USSR and Germany, they remained relatively weak, and were called 
mainly by British politicians – but after all, not only – “season” 
states. In general, the implementation of the British policy of “bal-
ance of power” on the continent can be explained by the rivalry be-
tween London and Paris. No one can deny the validity of the theses, 
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however, it should be realized that in the contemporary geopolitical 
situation extension of sovereignty over the region of interest was 
not feasible for any of the Western powers. The implementation of 
such a postulate of the prevailing realities could only be achieved 
with significant presence of the military factor. Neither France nor 
the United Kingdom, however, at this time had the executive capa-
bilities, as they did not show the necessary political will, as they 
concerned the region of Central Europe.
In the 1920’s and 1930’s, geopolitical thought was being domi-
nated by German concepts, which found its fullest expression in 
the works of the Munich Institute of Geopolitics and especially 
views of Karl Haushofer. He remained a great supporter of organiz-
ing the world in large areas of strategic interaction, which he called 
“pan-regions.” Central and Central-Eastern Europe was in the Eu-
ropean pan-region, the essence of which was the German-Russian 
cooperation, and actually a combination of the potentials of both 
(Gray, 1987: 187). In this way, a huge continental power, which 
can be called Eurasia, would be created. The core factor shaping 
the thought Haushofer was that the experience of the First World 
War, strengthening the convincement about the importance of his-
torical coexistence of Germany and Russia (Moczulski, 2010: 19). 
Haushofer recognized that the reasons for the war, which caused 
the disaster of both Empires, remained bilateral unreasonably and 
adversely constructed alliances. Haushofer acknowledged that the 
optimal course of events would be peacefully developed coopera-
tion and creation of a new geopolitical quality. The absence of the 
possibility of such a scenario allowed for solution to power – the 
conquest of Germany by Russia, or (which of course was preferred) 
of Russia by Germany (Gray, 1987: 158). The realization of these 
opportunities seemed to be possible in the light of the signing of the 
Rapallo Accord in April 1922, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Hitler-
Stalin) in August 1939. The German-Soviet War, which began in 
1941 shattered the implementation of these concepts. A separate 
issue is to assess the possibility of their fulfillment, when one con-
sider that both parties treated mutual alliances as ad hoc solutions, 
calculated to develop a better position before the final confronta-
tion. For these, a primary consideration is the fact that none of the 
adopted scenarios anticipated any geopolitical role for the nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe and did not respect their aspira-
tions. The geopolitical rivalry of the giants was based mainly on the 
dogma of the concentration of the power. Taking into account the 
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aspirations to independence of smaller nations did not fall within 
the possible scenarios.
This confirms the considerations reported in the introduction, 
according to which Ukrainian aspirations to independency could 
find their own “window of opportunity” stamping in situations of the 
drastic decline in the power of the main regional players – mainly 
Russia (then the Soviet Union) and, to a lesser extent, Germany. 
The years of 1917–1945 fully confirm this account. Supported by 
Germany (and, to a lesser extent, Austria-Hungary) Ukrainian na-
tionalist movement and affords for the independence turned out 
in 1918 to be illusory. The government of Pavlo Skoropadsky, in 
practice, brought the German occupation (Reginia-Zacharski, 2004: 
91). After Germany’s defeat in World War I, it was pretty soon es-
tablished that Ukrainians were not able to defend their statehood. 
Pressured on one side by the Anton Denikin and the Armed Forces 
of South Russia (Previously, the Volunteer Army), and on the other 
by Bolshevik forces, the Ukrainians finally were defeated. An at-
tempt to transfer the idea of  Ukrainian statehood to the left banks 
of the Zbruch River, implemented in 1920, and based on Polish 
military capabilities ended in another defeat for Ataman Symon 
Petliura. The counter-offensive of Bolshevik troops very seriously 
threatened the very survival of the Polish Republic (Reginia-Zach-
arski, 2004: 255). The involvement of other powers – France and 
Great Britain – during this period it is difficult to be seen as seri-
ous. Besides, the Ukrainian card itself was considered by politicians 
of both Western powers solely in terms of playing it in the political 
relations with other, more significant players. But this does not 
mean that the Ukrainian lands were considered to be negligible. 
The political analysis of the years 1917–1923 strongly emphasized 
the qualities of Ukrainian lands, both from the short and medium 
perspectives (e.g. calling the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, as “bread-peace”), 
as well as strategic. In the opinion of George Nathaniel Curzon, 
Mackinder, and even Jozef Pilsudski, Russia without Ukraine would 
be returned to in her history and geopolitical meaning to the seven-
teenth century. It seemed that for quite a long time Russia’s power 
on the Baltic Sea was significantly weakened. The independence 
of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and especially Poland and Finland 
in the north, resulted in a significant weakening of Russian influ-
ence. Any “loss” of Ukraine would create a similar situation in the 
south, cutting off Russia from the vast Black Sea coast. Loss in 
maritime policy in the opinion of the Curzon, in a quick way would 
lead to falling of Russia among the key players in world politics, and 
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would be the factor for deepening a degenerative trends and – as 
a result – the probability of decay (Reginia-Zacharski, 2004: 249). 
The conclusion drawn from this line of thinking was based on the 
belief that no Russian authorities could agree on such a solution, 
and each will seek to prevent such scenario, thereby positioning it-
self as extremely hostile to ideas of Ukrainian independence. Almost 
identical conclusions could be drawn from a conversation between 
Mackinder and Pilsudski held in Warsaw, in the autumn of 1919. 
Pilsudski, announcing future Polish military activity in the direc-
tion of Ukraine, presented it as an action to weaken Russia, and 
as a result to strengthen the geopolitical position of Poland. The 
British Commissioner recognized the legitimacy of such reasoning, 
although was quite pessimistic about Polish (or Polish-Ukrainian) 
opportunities. Mackinder was rather in favor to promote the con-
cept of supporting a “white Russian” option. Ultimately, the struggle 
for the geopolitical shape of the region was resolved in the years 
1921–1923 to disadvantage of Ukrainian aspirations. Ukrainian 
lands were in several political organisms. The lion’s share account-
ed for the Bolshevik Russia, and since 1922, the Soviet Union. It 
seems that one of the main reasons for this development of affairs 
was the lack of ability of self-identification of Ukrainians themselves 
as a nation-state. With the relative weakness of the external fac-
tors they were not able to fully exploit the quite impressive poten-
tial. The conclusion of the State Union between Western Ukraine 
(Halychyna) and the Ukrainian People’s Republic in January 1919 
from the very beginning had remained only on paper. Finally, it 
could be emphasized that with some exceptions (Poland), policy 
makers, and above all, societies and nations were tired of struggles 
and atrocities of war, so the West was not ready to accept any 
costs for remodeling the geopolitical shape of Eastern Europe. There 
is a noticeable decrease in its permanent influence in 1919 and 
1920 about the need to “calm” may indicate the fact that the first 
trade treaties with Bolshevik Russia were concluded by the “west-
ern world” a few days after the signing the peace treaty in Riga. As 
a result of these factors Ukrainian lands east of the river Zbruch for 
a few decades were (with the exception of a brief period of German 
occupation) in the hands of the Soviet Union (Reginia-Zacharski, 
2004: 325).
Another armed conflict, which swept through Europe in 1939–
1945, despite the hopes of some Ukrainian circles, did not open any 
“window of opportunity” for the idea of  an independent Ukraine. As 
soon as in 1939, almost all the lands which Ukrainians previously 
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aspired came under Soviet control (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 178). It is 
also worth noting that Soviet occupation prompted some political 
circles from Dnieper basin to create an unusual concept, having 
resulted in the recognition of the “Independence Day of Ukraine” – 
17th September, the day the Soviet attacked the Polish lands. Final-
ly, the result of the Second World War, reinforcing the global status 
of the Soviet Union, brought a significant change in the geopolitical 
architecture – all Ukrainian lands came under one dominion, but 
of course there was no question of independence. Although So-
viet diplomacy managed to achieve some “facade” settlement, such 
as finding the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as one of the 
founding members of the United Nations with its own representa-
tion in the General Assembly, those moves were dictated by the 
strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The border of the USSR was 
established on the so called “Curzon Line,” south leaned against 
the Izmail region, previously belonging to Romania. The agreement 
between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic on 29th 
June 1945, transferred the Carpathian Ruthenia to the USSR. At 
the same time the Soviet forces conducted a brutal and widespread 
action to combat the pro-independence movement in Ukraine (Mar-
ples, 2002: 146, 179–182).
The Decline of the “Cold War” and the Emergence 
of an Independent Ukrainian State
The period of 1945–1991 actually did not bring significant 
changes to the geopolitical situation of the Ukrainian lands. De-
pendence on the Kremlin was to became deeper and deeper – it 
is worth recalling that the Kiev Military District was the biggest, 
strongest, and best-equipped administrative strategic unit of the 
USSR (Brzeziński, 2007: k.e.). In the 1960s, on the 300th anniver-
sary of the signing of the Pereyaslav Contract, the USSR included 
the Crimean peninsula. However, in reality, for the Soviet Union 
this did not really matter, but in a strategic dimension significantly 
raised the meaning of the sub-region, which became a major ele-
ment of the Black Sea. The closeness of the Kerch Strait, which 
largely determines the interception of communications of the Azov 
Sea to the Black Sea, should be emphasized (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 
469). And finally, there was a question of a naval base in Sevasto-
pol, which can be described as basic “window on the world” in the 
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region in the military dimension. As it has been mentioned earlier, 
in the period of the Soviet Union the importance of such a redefini-
tion of Crimea “belonging” remained illusory, as it posed a political 
potential, which after 1991 became a real and significant factor in 
determining the model of distribution of power in the region (Cho-
dakiewicz, 2012: 448–449). The last decade of the existence of the 
USSR marked the noticeable revival of the Ukrainian issue, primar-
ily in the field of internal Soviet relations. In fact, even in 1970’s, 
following the Helsinki Accords, Ukrainians began the process of na-
tional redefinition (Brzeziński, 2007: k.e.). They were trying to take 
advantage of the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR in the 
late 1970’s to justify the secessionist aspirations.
Some geopolitical concepts from the time of the Cold War prop-
erly “bypassed” the Ukrainian issue, treating it (and the territory of 
Ukraine) as a component of the Soviet question in general (Gray, 
1987: 169–171). In his Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 
Saul B. Cohen placed the region of Central and Eastern Europe 
(including Ukraine) in the Eurasian Continental World, and more 
specifically in the part of the Heartland and Eastern Europe, with 
permanent Soviet domination over the region (Cohen, 1973: 83–84). 
In his later works, however, Cohen pointed out the importance of 
Ukraine to the strategic interests of Russia (Cohen, 2003: 216). He 
recognized that in the Soviet period, this issue remained “dormant” 
(Cohen, 2009: 214–215). In his views of the 1960s, Cohen saw po-
tential of changes in geopolitical systems, recognizing this sphere 
as characterized by “explosive” dynamic.
The very first symptoms of the collapse of the USSR in the 
1980s and 1990s were strongly marked in the Ukraine. The sig-
nificance of this “movement” was even more important towards the 
fact that the challenges appearing on the political horizon led to the 
creation of a “tactical” (if not “operational”) cooperation between the 
dissidents, often strongly raising aspirations for independence and 
nationalist views and the Ukrainian communist activists. In trying 
to explain this exotic “alliance,” one cannot ignore the importance 
of motivation, marked by the desire to express their own identi-
ty, deeply rooted in the Ukrainian elites of different provenance 
(Burdzy, 1995: 111). However, it seems that its main component 
was the belief of the end of a geopolitical formula and the desire 
to define the new activity in shaping the political and economic re-
ality. The August Declaration of Independence (1991) was adopted 
in the face of a possibility of the civil war, which appeared in con-
nection with the “Yanayev coup d’état” (Gupta, 2010: 154–155). 
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A referendum on independence held in December was, on the one 
hand, a consequence of this step, but also a response to the actual 
disintegration of the Soviet Union structures (Burdzy, 1995: 113).
It can also be assumed that among the Ukrainians there lasted 
a kind of “race” in which the Communist elites with Leonid Krav-
chuk at the head were about to “step ahead” and to define trends 
of the changes. Controlling a political process after emancipation 
of Ukraine gave a chance for ultimately political (and even physical) 
survival.
In the terms of foreign affairs the course taken by the Ukrainian 
decision-makers can also be seen as a kind of “preemptive move.” 
From the perspective of the evident failure of Gorbachev’s concept 
of Union of Sovereign Republics and the declaration of indepen-
dence taken by the majority of the Soviet republics, in 8th Decem-
ber 1991 in Wiskule, representatives from Russia (Boris Yeltsin), 
Ukraine (Leonid Kravchuk), and Belarus (Stanislau Shushkevich) 
signed the agreement appointing to the life the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) (Russia and the Commonwealth, 1997: 
passim). Soon after, on 21st December in Almaty, the subsequent 
Soviet republics acceded to CIS (Gupta, 2010: 71–73). It can be 
assumed that the process of defining CIS in geographic dimension 
lasted until 1993, when the position of Georgia and Azerbaijan was 
finally clarified (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 389). It soon turned out that 
the actual role of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the 
concepts of co-creating states was not commonly accepted (Russia 
and the Commonwealth, 1997: passim). By the mid-1990s, it was 
clear that Russia recognized the CIS as a platform for the reintegra-
tion of the post-Soviet area. The 1993 was the key – Russia adopted 
Constitution of the Federation, began the first Chechen war, which 
was a clear signal that attempts to further depletion of its territory 
as a result of irredentistism would met with a firm and brutal re-
sponse (Eberhardt, 1996: 207). In the autumn in Moscow, with use 
of tank guns the “debate” over the shape of the system of the Rus-
sian Federation was settled – the presidential model had won. Two 
years later – in 1995 – Russia was in a different situation. All armed 
conflicts ongoing in the former Soviet Union had been “frozen” (in 
one case, Tajikistan, there was a real and lasting solution), a regime 
of Alexander Lukashenko was installed in Belarus, representing 
the course for rapprochement with Russia, which was reflected in 
the signing of the agreement on the creation of the Union of Russia 
and Belarus, and later the Union State (Jaworsky, 1995: passim). 
In Georgia, after the fall of Zviad Gamzachurdia, as a result of the 
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civil war, the new president Eduard Shevardnadze also called for 
a tightening of cooperation with the Russian Federation. Georgia 
was under pressure of three “frozen” conflicts – in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and Adjara (in the first two, incidentally, as “peacekeepers” 
stationed Russian soldiers) (Jaworsky, 1995: ). The XIV Army, later 
transformed formally Operational Group of Russian Forces played 
similar role in the detachment of Transnistria (also called Trans-
Dniestr or Transdniestria) from Moldova (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 
221–222). Similar examples of tools to maintain the effect can be 
multiplied. From the Kremlin’s perspective, three Baltic republics 
– Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – seemed to be “lost,” although for 
the latter two Russian minority in size between 1/4 and 1/3 have 
posed quite a significant destructive potential for the future (Eber-
hardt, 1996: 191–192).
In such a situation it is not surprising that in the mid-1990s 
in the Russian Federation quite clearly articulated tendencies “re-
integration” emerged. The political expression of those tendencies 
was the decree of President Yeltsin, in whose words about the “near 
abroad” were used (Buzan, Waever, 2004: 418–420). Influential 
Russian newspapers and magazines commonly made reference 
to “when the Soviet Union will be resurrected” (Petersen, 2011: 79–
80). In the middle of the 1990’s, Nursultan Nazarbayev announced 
a project of creation of the East European (Eurasian) Union (Lib-
man, Vinokurov, 2012: 186–188). It would be naive to assume that 
the conception was the product of original thinking of the Presi-
dent of Kyrgyzstan. It should rather be seen as explicated concepts 
emerging in the Kremlin. Since then the increasing popularity of 
the concepts of Eurasia can be observed, represented by Alexan-
der Dugin (Sykulski, 2013: 353). They were particularly marked by 
geopolitical vision and a large dose of mysticism, however, formed 
as a base for the formulation of specific political programs (Russia 
and the Commonwealth, 1997: passim).
From this perspective, the initiatives of deepening and widening 
integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States can 
be seen as a soft scenario of the “gathering of the Russian (actually 
post-Soviet) lands” (Łomiński, 1997: 19). From the beginning of the 
creation of the CIS and its institutions Ukrainians tried to keep the 
distance from such scenarios (Buzan, Waever, 2004: 419). It was 
mainly accented in the military cooperation dimension – Ukraine 
was rather assertive to the “Tashkent Pact.” Ukrainians the longest, 
until 1994, tried to play the “nuclear card” (Eberhardt, 1996: 12–13). 
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In this gameplay, Ukrainian authorities managed to achieve a half 
of the success in the form of a Budapest Memorandum from De-
cember 1994 (Olchawa, 2009: 355), in which Russia, the United 
States and the United Kingdom guaranteed the independence and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for the transfer of nucle-
ar arsenals into the hands of Russia and the resignation of the (ad-
mittedly dubious) nuclear status and accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear (Burdzy, 1995: 88). The most complex 
and difficult issue in geostrategic relations with the Russian Fed-
eration remained the question of the status of the naval base in 
Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet (Eberhardt, 1996: 215–216). In 
1997, both states came together to settle these matters by 2017, 
and as a result of the signing, there was an agreement on the divi-
sion of the fleet and lease part of the city for twenty years (Russia 
and the Commonwealth, 1997: passim). The two countries signed 
the documents defining their relationship with NATO in 1997 (Pavli-
uk, 1999: 85–86). In the case of Ukraine, it was a document setting 
out the principles of the Distinctive Partnership. Simultaneously 
Ukraine was strongly involved in regional initiatives, alternative 
to the Russian vision of reintegration. The most important was the 
establishment in 1996 the Organization for Democracy and De-
velopment, which from next year to function as GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) – a multi-faceted consultative forum 
bringing together countries with a less than favorable relations with 
Russia. This political formula was in 1999 extended to Uzbekistan 
(GUAM became GUUAM). It is also worth of noting that just this 
year illustrated the serious crisis in the functioning of the CIS. The 
Treaty on Collective Security of CIS – founding the “Tashkent sys-
tem” (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan and since 1993 – Georgia and Belarus) was con-
tained in the May of 1992 (Russia and the Commonwealth, 1997: 
7–8). After the expiry of the five years of existence, in April 1999 
only six countries (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh-
stan, and Tajikistan) decided to prolong the cooperation (Protocol 
to extend the Treaty on Collective Security CIS) (Russia and the 
Commonwealth, 1997: passim).
In the dimension of foreign policy the Ukrainian decision-mak-
ers sought to pursue a policy based on the rather nebulous concept 
of “multi-vector.” The core of the doctrine was the assumption that 
it was possible and preferred to maintain equal relations with all 
international actors – individual as well as collective. Thus, the 
Ukrainian Issues in Geopolitical Thought of the Twentieth… 25
Ukrainian “opening to the West” (European Union and, to a lesser 
extent, NATO), was accompanied by the desire to maintain good 
relations with Russia and other regional initiatives (Chodakiewicz, 
2012: 389). It seems that the Ukrainians opted for entering into 
the integration processes in different directions so “shallow” that 
it would not limit the possibilities of action on the other theaters. 
A test for such trends was the attitude to the CIS. Ukraine treated 
the organization as a formula for a “velvet divorce.” The manage-
ment of the post-Soviet “bankruptcy estate” substantially consti-
tuted a great challenge; therefore this function of the CIS seemed 
to be quite natural. But pretty soon it became clear that restricting 
the organization’s mission to the only sphere did not get the ac-
ceptance of Russia. Operations in a multi-vector formula were pos-
sible only in a situation where none of the real or potential centers 
of power of global or regional program did not formulate a policy in 
counter to Ukrainian plans. In other words, the “multi-vector” could 
be realized only under conditions of weakness or lack of interest for 
Ukraine from those centers. It would seem that Russia immersed in 
a deep internal crisis was not able to block Ukrainian pro-Western 
aspirations (Buzan, Waever, 2004: 417). Europe and the United 
States were far from sending clear signals to Ukraine, recognizing 
that supporting pro-Western policy of this country would be read in 
Russia as a hostile action. “West” (primarily the European Union), 
set to “building friendly and non-confrontational” relations with the 
Kremlin at all costs and to avoid of drawing scenarios of events 
that could trigger negative Russian reactions (Buzan, Waever, 2004: 
418). At the beginning of this century, it was not uncommon to find 
declarations of the EU officials, like Romano Prodi, stating that “the 
Ukraine will never access to the EU” (Samokhvalov, 2007: 17). Ac-
cording to a possible strengthening of Ukraine’s cooperation with 
NATO and eventual accession to the Alliance it should be noted 
that – apart from the obvious reluctance of the Russian Federa-
tion – the deep shadow laid on the possibilities of achieving those 
goals (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 411). First, until 2017, a part of the 
Ukrainian state of particular strategic importance (Sevastopol) re-
mained outside of its authority. Secondly, research conducted in 
the Ukraine public opinion, shown that as long as the prospect of 
the EU membership has enjoyed considerable popularity, NATO 
was seen as an opponent and the strengthening cooperation with 
the Alliance as way to aggregate deterioration in relations with Rus-
sia (Samokhvalov, 2007: 17–18).
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Ukraine and Russia after the “Orange Revolution” 
– Growing  Tension
It seemed that the Orange Revolution permanently changed the 
orientation of Ukraine to being pro-Western (Wilson, 2005: 176). 
The formal dimension of such a “reformatting” could provide even 
a total and final rejection by the state ruled by Viktor Yushchen-
ko, and the concept of the Common Economic Space, which led 
to its collapse in 2006. Ukrainian-Russian relations deteriorated 
even during the “Revolution” and after that looked like that would 
not soon to be improve. A new prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, 
played an interesting role in relations with the Russian Federa-
tion (Samokhvalov, 2007: 19). On the one hand, she was seen as 
an icon of assertiveness towards Russia, and even anti-Russian, 
on the other hand, she was the driving force behind the building 
of new economic spheres. Pretty soon there was to begin the pro-
cess of decomposition of the “orange” camp, which in the next five 
years – after the imposition of the effects of the deteriorating state 
of the economy – lost a significant amount social capital received at 
the turn of 2004/2005. The Ukrainian-Russian relations was also 
shadowed (and perhaps primarily) by the gas-related issues that 
have also not been an easy subject (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 456). The 
increase of the tension occurred by the spring of 2005, when Gaz-
prom tried to lead to raise gas prices for Ukraine to $160, paid per 
1000 m3. In response, Kiev raised the price for transit of Russian 
gas. Conflict (hereinafter “gas war”) (Ebel, 2009: 9–10), escalated 
throughout 2005. In December, to stiffen the positions (Gazprom 
called for an increase the price of gas to the level of $220–230 per 
1000 cubic meters, while Kiev was willing to pay $80), the Rus-
sians announced the suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine on the 
1st  January, 2006, which became a reality. The resumption of sup-
plies and transit through Ukraine admittedly came after four days, 
when on the 4th January a preliminary agreement was signed by 
Russia and Ukraine, but the first edition of the “gas war” was re-
vealed by the fact that the energy crises had at least regional sig-
nificance (Ebel, 2009: 44). More than a dozen European countries 
have seen decreases in the supply of “blue fuel” range from a doz-
en to more than 40%. As the culmination of the crisis fell on the 
middle of winter, some reactions of the countries affected directly 
and indirectly by its consequences were nervous. The majority of 
affected governments and societies were hostile to the authorities 
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in Kiev. Further openings of the Ukrainian-Russian “gas conflict” 
followed in subsequent years – fall 2007 and winter 2008. It seemed 
that in November of 2008, a lasting settlement was achieved. In 
fact, a long-term arrangement between Gazprom and Naftogaz was 
signed. It did not take long – at the end of the year, the conflict 
entered into a new phase, the sharpest and most painful of all. 
On 1st January 2009, Gazprom completely blocked the supply of 
gas to Ukraine, while ensuring that continuity of supply for Euro-
pean countries which were dependent on transit through Ukraine 
was to be maintained. Six days later it was proved to be untrue. 
Reducing the gas pressure in transmission infrastructure led to sig-
nificant declines – some European countries even longer receive 
raw Russian, other recorded declines in the level of 70–90%. The 
Slovak authorities have decided about the implementing a state of 
emergency for the economy. The European Union, despite attempts 
to mediate between Ukraine and Russia for 9th January, was not 
able to control the situation (Wilson, 2005: 171). Only after 10 days 
of acute crisis, an agreement was signed in Moscow, which has 
reduced tension and at least temporarily ensured the stability of 
supply (Ebel, 2009: 12–13).
It is difficult to fully assess the consequences of this crisis for 
the economy of Ukraine. In the opinion of some analysts, there 
is even the term “disaster” (Wilson, 2005: 158–159). In the politi-
cal dimension, one can talk about the price the “orange” suffered 
for the balance of the years 2005–2009. The presidential elections 
(first round in January, the second February of 2010) were won 
by Viktor Yanukovych. The second round, which faced Yulia Ty-
moshenko gave a result of 48.95% to 45.47% (Chodakiewicz, 2012: 
304–305). These results complemented the image of the “end of the 
Orange Revolution,” and clearly dominated by the Party of Regions. 
That meant a reactivation of pro-Russian tendencies in Ukraine, 
although the new government still declared the readiness for im-
plementation of scenarios of “soft integration” with the European 
Union. This time was also marked by a significant change – De-
cember 9, 2010, in Moscow, the presidents of Russia, Dmitry Med-
vedev, Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko and Nursultan Nazarbayev 
signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Single Economic 
Space (SES) and the agreement on the rules for the functioning of 
this structure. SES had become operational from 1st January 2012 
and, according to the Russian announcement, was to lead to the 
establishment of the common market (the four freedoms: flow of 
goods, services, capital, and labor) on the model of the European 
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Communities. The first signs of a desire for inclusion into the for-
mula soon appeared from the new authorities of Ukrainian state. 
Due to previous trends, the start of accession negotiations by the 
Ukrainians to SES would be tantamount to freezing in the direction 
of European integration policy (Cooper, 2013: 24–26).
In 2010, new provisions for the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevas-
topol were defined. According to the agreement signed on 21st April 
2010, in Kharkov, duration of stationing of the Black Sea Fleet 
of the Russian Federation in the Crimea was extended after 2017 
by 25 years, until 2042 with an option to extend it for a further 
five years. In strategic terms, it meant a permanent placement of 
Ukraine in the Russian area of  influence. It’s difficult to imagine the 
deepening cooperation with NATO in the situation of “limited sover-
eignty” of a part of the country. Of course, these factors accounted 
for foreground determinants defining the geopolitical position of 
Ukraine, but it should be considered that the general change in the 
region occurred after the Caucasian war of August 2008. Russia 
then made  it clear that when faced with a deep geopolitical redefi-
nition it would not hesitate to use military force. In addition, the 
price that the Russian state has paid for the use of troops against 
the integrity and independence of the sovereign state has proved 
to be negligible. In fact, from this period comes pretty grim joke that 
the reward for the strike in the direction of Tbilisi by the Russian 
58 Army will be awarded by an excursion to Crimea. An agreement 
held in Moscow, announced as a great success of the French Presi-
dency of the EU, was honored by the Kremlin in part, for which 
again the Russian Federation did not suffer any consequences or 
punishment. In 2009, the new American administration led by 
Barack Obama announced a “reset” in relations with Russia, de-
claring at the same time moving American geopolitical priorities into 
the Far East. It seemed that the world has entered the era of the 
new geopolitical order. American policy since the 1940s was based 
on the paradigm of the “Peninsular power” (Rimmland) proposed by 
Nicolas Spykman (Spykman, 2008: 177). The core of the postulate 
– a strong presence in Europe, has been profoundly redefined. In 
addition, between 2008 and 2010 “a coalition of Central European 
nations,” built largely on the basis of a group of countries whose 
leaders were present in Tbilisi in August 2008 on the appeal of the 
Polish President, was under the process of dismantling (Chodakie-
wicz, 2012: 534). The death of Lech Kaczynski was a visible end of 
the project, as was illustrated by a list of participants in the funeral.
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Another factor on the international scene appeared – the East-
ern Partnership. Initiated in 2008, formally launched at a sum-
mit in Prague in May the following year, the Partnership assumed 
closer EU cooperation with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Although, from the very beginning, the 
economic dimension of the relationship was exposed, the initiative 
has undoubtedly also had an important political meaning (Szczer-
biak, 2012: 104). The initiator and spiritus movens of the project 
has been the Republic of Poland, enjoying the support of a Sweden. 
They gave some geopolitical overtones to the Eastern Partnership, 
especially by articulating the principle of communitarianism at the 
regional interests. The hopes reported in Warsaw and Stockholm 
to transform this initiative into a defined EU policy failed. Regard-
less of these observations it should be emphasized that the Part-
nership established a fairly permanent platform for maintaining 
an open dialogue with the option of integration. The breakthrough 
was to be a Partnership summit, which was scheduled for the end 
of November 2013 in Vilnius.
The period of years 2010–2013 can be described towards 
Ukraine as an attempt to return to the concept of “multi-vector” in 
its foreign policy. Its implementation, however, ultimately proved 
to be impossible. The main reason was the significant tightening 
poles of power – above all Russia. After the war against Georgia the 
Russian Federation was repeatedly sending signals that it would 
not allow any moves or transformations of its own strategic bound-
aries of influence. Despite the declared willingness to deepen coop-
eration with the European Union authorities in Kiev were aware of 
the growing pressure from the Kremlin and tried to avoid decisive 
solutions. Some evidence of this can be the mentioned forcing of 
Ukraine to extend the contract towards the Black Sea Fleet earlier 
than it would as a result from the adoption of the 1997 agenda. 
Russia used other spoilers. In addition to the gas and oil as tools 
of pressure on Kiev, the Crimean issue returned. The problem of 
the peninsula mostly inhabited by Russian-speaking population 
and people clearly declaring the Russian nationality was often put 
among the “hot” issues in bilateral relations (Dima, 2010: 17). Any 
pro-Western inclinations of Ukrainian society became the object 
of attack of the forces concentrated on the Eastern Ukraine, with 
particular emphasis on the Donbass region. The public attitudes in 
addition to the complex of ethnic issues were affected by constant-
ly deteriorating economic situation. It particularly concerned the 
huge state’s economic sector. In 2013, Ukraine had to repay about 
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$10 billion of debt. As a result, the Ukrainian foreign exchange 
reserves declined from 31.8 billion dollars in early 2012 to approx. 
$20 billion at the end of 2013, and as a consequence of the dif-
ficult financial situation of the country have generated unsolvable 
problems with the settlement of payments in the public sector and 
the expected withdrawal of the necessary reforms. By the end of 
2013, Ukraine failed to properly implement any of the projects for 
the prospect of independence from Russian energy supplies. Tra-
ditionally, the tension in this area was enlarged in the winter and 
autumn months.
A significant part of Ukrainian society desired opportunities 
to improve their living standards, the economic situation and the 
functioning of the state which have been seen as possible from the 
perspective of association with the European Union. Negotiations 
on this subject started already in 2007, but the initialing of the 
agreement was not until five years later. In 2012, the position of 
the EU decision-makers, however, made the signing appropriate ac-
cords impossible. This matter was postponed to the third summit 
of Eastern Partnership and warranted by the progress in reforms in 
the three sectors – implementing progress on political and economic 
reforms, ensuring the democratic standards of the electoral system, 
and stopping of the persecution of political opponents. This last is-
sue in 2013 took a particularly severe course in keeping in custody 
and penal colony former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who be-
came a symbol of political persecution. Despite the enthusiasm and 
hopes connected with the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 
the Ukrainian position was not clear. Yet on the 21st of November the 
Ukrainian government decided to “suspend preparations for signing 
the Association Agreement,” justifying it by the interests of national 
security. Anyway signals that Kiev may withdraw from the Associa-
tion Agreement began to appear a few weeks earlier. The fiasco of the 
process of associating of Ukraine with the European Union, however, 
caused some surprise for the European political elites, which could 
be explained by a weak orientation in the seriousness of Russian 
pressure on torpedoing any pro-Western aspirations of Ukraine. Rus-
sian threat of sanctions, as well as entry into a much more “asser-
tive” standards toward Kiev economic and financial policies, on the 
other hand, were balanced with the promises of economic support 
in case of suspension of the pro-European course. This politics fell 
on fertile ground in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovych in the perspective 
of presidential elections to take place in 2015 decided to take course 
to immediate and ad hoc leverage the Ukrainian economy. From this 
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perspective, the Russian offer was characterized by a usability and 
functionality (Shoemaker, 2014: 288–289).
Russia, as written above, after achieving success in the “near 
abroad” in the form of suppressing almost all of the emancipatory 
movements in the region could not agree for any signs of erosion 
its own geostrategic zone.1 At the third summit of the Eastern Part-
nership, only Moldova and Georgia decided about the initial As-
sociation Agreements with the EU. Armenia was considered to be 
more likely to fall in line with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus 
(a customs union within the Common Economic Space). Yanu-
kovych’s decision actually was a breakthrough in the EU’s east-
ern policy, and the Vilnius summit brought feelings of failure and 
disappointment.
While the reaction of the concerned countries was predictable, 
the events in Kiev, as well as their development were a real sur-
prise. Yet on the 21st November at the Independence Square serious 
protests began against postponing the signing of the agreement 
with the EU. From the 24th November, opposition groups joined 
to the protest – primarily Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), UDAR, and 
Svoboda (Freedom). Attempts to force the authorities to suppress 
“Євромайдан” resulted on 30th November in the eruption of conflict 
on an unpredictable scale – at the peak on the Maidan 800,000 peo-
ple gathered. The movement affected also some other cities, in large 
part from the radical western Ukraine. In mid-December, the issue 
of signing an association agreement seemed a foregone conclusion. 
Yanukovych’s team announced a definitive move away from this 
concept, and the authorities of the European Union withdrew from 
the project of returning to negotiations. At the beginning of 2014, 
the situation around Євромайдан significantly tightened, turning 
into an almost regular fight for the heart of the capital. Clashes and 
attempts of takeover the power by opponents of the government oc-
curred in many towns in western and central Ukraine. Throughout 
January and a part of February, tension grew and the mediation ef-
forts undertaken by representatives of the EU did not bring any sig-
nificant results. Some attempts to solve the crisis, taken by the po-
litical forces in Ukraine, remained equally fruitless. Political leaders 
of the opposition – Vitaly Klitschko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Oleh 
Tiahnybok became the faces of the protest. But one cannot ignore 
1 Even Georgia, since October 2012 under Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili 
and since the autumn of 2013 under President Giorgi Margvelashvili, has not been 
seen as reluctant towards Russia.
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the fact that in late January and February 2014, the Євромайдан 
grew into an independent political force, and any findings, which 
were made in the formula government/political opposition had to be 
verified on the Maidan.
Євромайдан and the Aftermath
The second half of February was characterized by a tightening 
of the positions, which resulted with escalation of the fighting and 
increased number of victims. The peak of the tension occurred be-
tween 18th and 22nd of February. The regime forces took the assault 
of crushing the Maidan – within a day and a half according to offi-
cial data dozen people were killed in Kiev. A few hours of “truce” did 
not led to any findings and on the 20th February fighting erupted in 
the capital again – the Ministry of Health reported that during the 
clashes that day 75 people were killed and 567 were injured. The 
other areas of the country at that time were refusing the obedience 
to the regime; barricades were formed in many cities and the new 
administration was spontaneously created by the local initiatives. In 
Kiev, negotiations between Yanukovych and the envoys of the EU – 
the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland were in prog-
ress. Negotiating positions were supported by the announcement of 
personal and general restrictions, and sanctions containing freez-
ing foreign accounts of the officials and a ban on arms trade with 
Ukraine. A short time earlier sanctions were imposed by the United 
States and Canada. On the 21st February, a breakthrough in talks 
between opposition, EU diplomats, and President Yanukovych was 
achieved. After all-night negotiations, some important provisions 
were adopted: limitation of the rights of the President to those from 
the Constitution of 2004, the creation of a new government within 
10 days and early presidential elections that would be held no later 
than in December 2014. The agreement did not stand the test of 
time – the mood in the city went much further than the agreed con-
ditions; in many parts of the state mandate of the president and 
the government was finally rejected. In such a situation the night 
of 21th and 22nd February, Yanukovych with a group of closest col-
laborators decided to flee, first to the east of Ukraine, then to Rus-
sia. On 22nd February, Viktor Yanukovych was dismissed from 
his post, and Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed as the interim 
head of state the next day. Three days later, a new government was 
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established, with Arseniy Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister. In spite of 
that, it seemed that the revolution enjoyed the ultimate success, the 
country was in a disastrous situation. It soon turned out that the 
new authorities had to face the next challenge, which was irreden-
tism and Russian aggression. The first blow went to the Crimea. In 
regard to this region, Russia used a specific strategy of war, lead-
ing the aggression in sometimes called, for lack of a better term, in 
a “subliminal” way. The activities consisted, on the one hand, the 
support of local elements hostile to the Ukrainian state, as well as 
providing military equipment and trained soldiers, who, however, 
did not use any of the Russian state emblems, as well as carefully 
hid their identity. Accompanied by parallel intensive Russian pro-
paganda and diplomatic activity aimed at showing a total lack of 
links of the Russian Federation with the events on the peninsula. 
Admittedly, ethno-social conditions definitely favored contesting 
and deconstruction of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea. The vast 
majority of its inhabitants are ethnically Russian, having a Russian 
identity and consciousness (Arel, Ruble, 2006: 117). The Russian 
military presence in the Black Sea bases and the special status of 
Sevastopol had also great importance. Ukrainian forces finally, after 
the turmoil and crisis, the current form of statehood and political 
system in the Crimea, found themselves in a precarious situation. 
This can partly be explained by disloyalty to the Ukrainian state of 
the part of the population and a large group of military. Another 
factor was that for various reasons the new Ukrainian authorities 
have not decided on taking a firm stand against the forces support-
ing the detachment of the Crimea. For a similar, though slightly 
more complex reasons Western countries did not react in definite 
manner. Even during the Crimean crisis in some Western coun-
tries (mainly Germany) in the media quite often appeared voices 
questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian rights to Crimea, both 
in terms of historical and legal arguments, as well as geopolitical 
conditions. From the 25th February, the situation in Crimea looked 
worse. In growing numbers well-armed and trained people whose 
uniforms were devoid of any markings were dispatching from Rus-
sia to the peninsula. Although there was little doubt about the fact 
that they were Russian soldiers, FR authorities claimed that Russia 
had no involvement in this crisis. During conferences Putin sought 
to ridicule both the presence of the Ukrainian state in the Crimea, 
as well as Western countries involvement. Some attempts to carry 
out on-site inspections, undertaken primarily under the auspices 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, proved 
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to be ineffective. International observers were not allowed to enter 
to the territory of the peninsula. Meanwhile, on the spot unmarked 
Russian units took over additional objects of strategic importance 
(on the 28th February Belbek airport in Sevastopol and border out-
posts around the city were occupied). The Ukrainian authorities 
claimed that up to the beginning of March the number of Russian 
soldiers in the Crimea reached about 6000, eight military transport 
aircraft Il-76, ten helicopters Mi-8 and Mi-24 and about 30 armored 
vehicles BTR-80. Parallel action in other parts of the peninsula re-
sulted by taking over the Ukrainian military bases and vessels. The 
position of the Russian Federation expressed was on the 1st March 
2014, when the Commission of Defense and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Federation Council, and later the entire Federa-
tion Council unanimously adopted an appeal to the President to use 
of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. Protests 
of the “international community” remained quite weak, and did 
not brought any measurable effects. The process of “swallowing” 
of the Crimea was continued. According to Ukrainian estimates 
on the 7th March numbers of Russian forces in the Crimea exceeded 
30,000. From mid-March through the Kerch Strait from the  Rus-
sian soil by the ferry connection significant quantities of heavy mili-
tary equipment, raw materials (fuels) as well as elements of the 
energy infrastructure were constantly being delivered.
On the 16th March irredentists held a “referendum” in the area 
of  the Crimean peninsula. According to the “official” results 96.77% 
of voters were in favor of the reunification of the Crimea with Rus-
sia. The turnout was projected at over 80%. The Verkhovna Rada of 
the Crimea adopted a resolution on the independence of the Crimea 
with the support of 85 deputies. The next steps were relatively easy 
to predict – the announcement of the creation of the Republic of 
Crimea and the transformation of local autonomic authorities into 
the State Council of the Republic of Crimea. Five days later, Vladi-
mir Putin signed the act of ratification of the Treaty on the Adoption 
of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and annexa-
tion was thus completed. For many analysts, a very probable sce-
nario after the annexation of Crimea by Russia was the extension 
of the Russian aggression to specific regions of Ukraine bordering 
the peninsula from the north. This was due to two reasons – first, 
it seemed a natural desire to create a land corridor between the 
Crimea and the Federation, on the other hand – the lack of secu-
rity for the vitally important supplies by land (Crimea depended 
from the north even to the extent of drinking water), caused quite 
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a difficult estimate as to the cost of logistical support of a “new 
Russian territory.” It might seem that the fate of the “Mariupol cor-
ridor” and the Kherson circuit were a foregone conclusion. However, 
a few weeks before the presidential elections announced for the 
25th of May, in Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk) revealed less clearly 
supported initially, then almost openly by Russia, forces of “sepa-
ratists” (irredentists – more precisely) started the riot. In practice, 
they consisted of the Russian saboteurs, local leaders of the Rus-
sian minority and certainly sizeable in the size of the criminal ele-
ment. About the 20th of May, in practice, these forces took control 
of significant areas of Donbass – first of all the major cities. A few 
days before the election, the Ukrainian authorities have begun “an-
ti-terrorist action,” which has been in fact a counteroffensive in 
the direction of Lugansk and Donetsk. Heavy fighting with growing 
involvement of Russian military entered into a chronic phase. In 
late August and early September irredentist forces opened another 
front – the attack was conducted by Novoazovsk in the direction of 
Mariupol. It seemed as a returning the scenario predicted in March. 
At this phase of the conflict, there has been undeniable evidence 
of the involvement of regular combat units of the Russian army. 
Reactions of the European Union and NATO remained (and remain) 
inappropriately weak in relation to the threat. The North Atlan-
tic Alliance Summit held in September in Newport, Wales, did not 
bring virtually anything concrete. Undoubtedly, the warm welcome 
of President Petro Poroshenko could not replace the unequivocal 
statements of support and announcement direct aid. The European 
Union was even more naive – a truce in eastern Ukraine achieved in 
Minsk, became the pretext for the announcement of the withdrawal 
of sanctions against Russia. As for the ceasefire – it is not a secret 
that its conclusion was not to work out a firm and durable com-
promise. On the one hand, Ukrainian forces have been exhausted 
and unable to conduct serious military operation. Another aim was 
the desire to free soldiers closed in the encirclement near Ilovaisk. 
In the political dimension Poroshenko tried to make an impression 
in Newport that he is not a leader of the country in a deep defen-
sive. The Russian side did not respect the truce, leading rocket fire 
on selected objects, and developing offensive intended to achieve 
a permanent foothold on the Sea of  Azov, which was confirmed 
by the Ukrainian sources on 10th of September (Komsomolske was 
taken between the 6th and 9th of September, and therefore during 
the after signing the “ceasefire agreement”). The direction and the 
intensity of further military operations by forces of the Russian 
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Federation with the cooperation with them rebels remains an open 
issue. It seems that the minimum scenario is to create a perma-
nent land corridor to Crimea and the possible extension of facilities 
for the peninsula to Kherson. Although there are no data on the 
costs incurred by Russia towards absorption and management of 
the peninsula, they must be considerable. Lowering these through 
a permanent land connection seems to be a “logistical priority.” 
A maximalist variant on the southern direction can assume an ad-
vance to the west, resulting in the cut off Ukraine from the Black 
Sea, and finally getting to Transnistria. In the short term, the sec-
ond scenario does not seem to be easy for two reasons. The first is 
its high cost-absorption, both in financial terms as well (actually 
mostly) the political. Secondly, the creation of such seaside “belt” 
would result in forming the area susceptible to impact Ukraini-
an forces and activities for destabilization, which would generate 
significant costs. It seems that from the Russian perspective the 
condition to achieve the maximal outcome (the corridor to Trans-
nistria) would be destroying, or at least a radical weakening of the 
Ukrainian center of power and Ukrainian military capabilities. Even 
the breakdown of the regular forces of the Ukrainian state would 
not guarantee peace in such a “belt.” Therefore, achieving the de-
composition of the Ukrainian state seems to be the best solution 
for Russian strategists. The concepts of “federalization” – officially 
proclaimed by irredentists from Donetsk and Lugansk, serve this 
purpose and will be supported by the Russian Federation. It is 
worth noting that since the first half of September in the Russian 
narration and media significantly often guests the term “Noworos-
sija” (New Russia), which shows the ideological layer of Russian 
geostrategic intentions.
On the basis of Russian doctrinal and strategic documents of 
the last several years one can note a strong increase of the impor-
tance of coercive and strictly strength attitudes. The nature of the 
reform of the armed forces of the Russian Federation allows, as-
suming that the plans of building flexible but a strong recourse of 
military tools designate the way of achieving political goals. Modern 
amphibious assault vessels “Mistral,” contracted in France, are one 
rationale for requesting intention to secure the Russian Federa-
tion free and wide access to the Black Sea. The possibility of the 
revision of the 2010 agreement towards Sevastopol and the Black 
Sea Fleet base in Crimea, which after the “victory of EuroMaidan” 
could be predicted, was one of the major themes of the Kremlin de-
cision about the necessity of detachment of the peninsula from the 
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Ukrainian state. Organizing and supporting the insurgency in the 
eastern Ukraine and the transfer of activities to the northern coast 
of the Sea of Azov is to some extent a consequence of the decisions.
If the above inferences are correct, the probability of escalation 
of objectives and moves of Russian politics should be seen as ex-
tremely high. The quite sluggish responses of the European Union 
and NATO countries do not seem to be sufficient to stop the aggres-
sion. On the other hand, sanctions against Russia and retaliate 
actions triggered a chain of actions and reactions by opening the 
potential for escalation of international tension.
The one of the possible scenarios is the continuation of the ag-
gression and “playing” for erosion of the Ukrainian state. The aim 
of Russian Federation, actually already present among the strategic 
options, could be Republic of Moldova, or at least create a “corridor” 
to Transnistria. Then Ukraine would lose not only access to the 
Black Sea, but also control over the mouths of the rivers Dnies-
ter and Southern Boh. Russia would also control the mouth of the 
Dniester. The geopolitical and strategic benefits arising from such 
a scenario are obvious for the Russian Federation. But again, its 
implementation and consolidation would only be possible with the 
destruction of the Ukrainian statehood. It is also worth noting that 
in this perspective, Russia’s activity in the direction of the Baltic (Es-
tonia, Latvia and Lithuania) should be perceived as an information-
al “diversion,” calculated on a temporary distraction from the real 
course of action. From the short or medium perspective – at least. 
Coming back to the coast of the Baltic Sea could be the next step.
Conclusions
Considering Ukrainian issues in the context of the game of pow-
ers in “time” and “space” it is tempting to make a general account. 
Since 1654, any chance of implementation of Ukrainian aspirations 
for independence and sovereignty are primarily the function of the 
ability to maintain “Russia far from Ukraine.” As for the trend is 
actually little doubt: for centuries optimal from the perspective of 
Moscow (or St. Petersburg) scenario was to keep land in the basins 
of the Dnieper and Boh under direct control. Any “softening,” “au-
tonomy,” “federation” or any other formulas dependence resulted 
only from the reduction or absence of the possibility of achieving 
full set of goals by the Russian center (Buzan, Waever, 2004: 422).
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